Effects of Symptom Presentation Order on Perceived Disease Risk by Kwan, Virginia S. Y. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology Psychology, Department of
4-2012
Effects of Symptom Presentation Order on
Perceived Disease Risk
Virginia S. Y. Kwan
Arizona State University, virginia.kwan@asu.edu
Sean P. Wojcik
University of California, Irvine, seanwojcik@gmail.com
Talya Miron-shatz
Ono Academic College, talyam@ono.ac.il
Ashley M. Votruba
Arizona State University, ashley.votruba@unl.edu
Christopher Y. Olivola
University of Warwick, colivola@andrew.cmu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.
Kwan, Virginia S. Y.; Wojcik, Sean P.; Miron-shatz, Talya; Votruba, Ashley M.; and Olivola, Christopher Y., "Effects of Symptom
Presentation Order on Perceived Disease Risk" (2012). Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology. 909.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/909
 
 
 
Published in Psychological Science 23:4 (April 2012), pp. 381–385; doi: 10.1177/0956797611432177 
Copyright © 2012 Virginia S. Y. Kwan, Sean P. Wojcik, Talya Miron-shatz, Ashley M. Votruba, and 
Christopher Y. Olivola. Used by permission. 
Submitted June 24, 2011; revised and accepted November 2, 2011; published online March 5, 2012. 
 
 
Effects of Symptom Presentation Order 
on Perceived Disease Risk 
 
 
Virginia S. Y. Kwan,1 Sean P. Wojcik,2 Talya Miron-shatz,3 
Ashley M. Votruba,1 and Christopher Y. Olivola4 
 
1. Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA 
2. University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California, USA 
3. Ono Academic College, Kiryat Ono, Israel 
4. University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom 
 
Corresponding author – Virginia S. Y. Kwan, Arizona State University—Psychology, PSYB Room 247, Tempe, AZ 
85287, email Virginia.kwan@asu.edu 
 
Abstract 
People are quick to perceive meaningful patterns in the co-occurrence of events. We report two stud-
ies exploring the effects of streaks in symptom checklists on perceived personal disease risk. In the 
context of these studies, a streak is a sequence of consecutive items on a list that share the character-
istic of being either general or specific. We identify a psychological mechanism underlying the effect 
of streaks in a list of symptoms and show that the effect of streaks on perceived risk varies with the 
length of the symptom list. Our findings reveal a tendency to infer meaning from streaks in medical 
and health decision making. Participants perceived a higher personal risk of having an illness when 
presented with a checklist in which common symptoms were grouped together than when presented 
with a checklist in which these same symptoms were separated by rare symptoms. This research 
demonstrates that something as arbitrary as the order in which symptoms are presented in a checklist 
can affect perceived risk of disease. 
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The ability to distinguish meaningful patterns from meaningless coincidences is a vital part 
of human cognition (Feldman, 2004; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). However, the mind is 
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often too quick to infer meaning from coincidences (Gilovich, 1993; Nickerson, 2004; 
Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2009). People expect random processes to result in fewer repeti-
tions of the same event than they actually do—the gambler’s fallacy (Falk & Konold, 1997; 
Nickerson, 2002; Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland, & Hastie, 2009). Underestimating the 
occurrence of streaks (i.e., when a characteristic is repeated in consecutive events) of ran-
dom or arbitrary events is so prevalent that it shapes the way people generate lists of out-
comes for random events (Tune, 1964; Wagenaar, 1972), categorize repeated events (Ayton 
& Fischer, 2004), and reason about repeated events, both prospectively (Morrison & Or-
deshook, 1975) and retrospectively (Matthews, 2010; Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2008; Op-
penheimer & Monin, 2009). 
Studies suggest that reasoning about event co-occurrences can affect medical judgment. 
Some findings show that physicians underestimate the likelihood of separate medical con-
ditions co-occurring in the same patient (Redelmeier, Tan, & Booth, 1998). Other findings 
suggest that the tendency to overweigh coincidental co-occurrences leads to medical false 
alarms, such as the perception of illusory cancer epidemics (Gawande, 1999), and to erro-
neous causal associations, such as those between weather conditions and the intensity of 
arthritis pain (Redelmeier & Tversky, 1996) or between the measles-mumps-rubella vac-
cination and autism (Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2009). 
The Internet is a widely used source of health information for the public. In 2009, 61% 
of American adults looked online to find health information (Pew Internet & American 
Life Project, 2009; Rutten, Moser, Beckjord, Hesse, & Croyle, 2007). Research is needed to 
understand how the presentation of information on Web pages about health influences 
laypeople’s assessments of their medical symptoms. 
We began the research reported here by surveying the formats used to present disease 
symptoms online. First, we identified the top five health-information Web sites produced 
by a Google search for “cancer”: cancer.org (the American Cancer Society, ACS), can-
cer.gov (the National Cancer Institute, NCI), WebMD, MedicineNet.com, and the New 
York Times Health Guide. We then conducted pilot studies to identify the formats used by 
these sites to present information on the individual Web pages for the 12 forms of cancer 
that were most deadly in 2008 (American Cancer Society, 2009). We found that these Web 
sites presented a mix of general symptoms (i.e., symptoms that are common and mild, 
frequently experienced, and considered minor) and specific symptoms (i.e., symptoms that 
are rare and severe, seldom experienced, and considered major), and that both types of 
symptoms were listed in streaks.1 
Given the human tendency to ascribe meaning to streaks, reading about multiple gen-
eral symptoms consecutively (as commonly happens) may heighten people’s perception 
of their risk of disease. Furthermore, people judge self-experienced coincidences to be 
more surprising and therefore more meaningful than the same coincidences experienced 
by other people (Falk, 1989). This bias could be a mechanism behind a possible effect of 
streaks on perceived personal risk when people are evaluating their own symptoms. 
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Overview of the Studies 
 
In two studies, we examined whether the order in which symptoms are presented on a 
checklist influences assessments of disease risk. In Study 1, we investigated whether par-
ticipants perceived their cancer risk to be higher when they completed a symptom checklist 
that presented streaks of general symptoms and streaks of specific symptoms than when 
they completed a checklist that presented general and specific symptoms in alternation. 
The results of Study 1 allowed us to identify a mechanism underlying the effect of the order 
of symptom presentation on perceived risk. Study 2 examined whether this effect varied 
with the length of the symptom list. 
 
Study 1: Order of Symptom Presentation 
 
In Study 1, we tested whether the order in which general and specific symptoms are pre-
sented on a checklist affects participants’ subsequent assessment of their cancer risk. We 
predicted that individuals would perceive their level of risk to be higher when they were 
given symptom lists in which general symptoms appeared in a streak than when they were 
given a list with alternating general and specific symptoms. We believed that this effect 
would occur as a result of the experience of checking off several general symptoms in a 
row. 
Designing this study required consideration of what constitutes a streak. Studies have 
found that people perceive a streak after an event repeats three or four times (Carlson & 
Shu, 2007; Gold, 1997). One functional MRI study even found a significant hemodynamic 
neural response following just one repetition (two occurrences) of an outcome (Huettel, 
Mack, & McCarthy, 2002). Thus, the number of repetitions required to form a streak is low 
but does vary. Context must be considered when predicting the number of repetitions 
needed to qualify as a streak: Given the high stakes of the medical context we used in our 
studies, we expected that this threshold would be low, as participants would err on the 
side of caution when judging the significance of their symptoms. We therefore chose to 
present a streak of three items for this study. 
This study also explored whether presenting checklist symptoms in streaks affects re-
spondents’ perception of which symptoms they have. We reasoned that a streak of general 
symptoms on a list would increase the likelihood of checking off a streak of symptoms 
(because they were actually experienced), which in turn might lower the threshold for 
checking off subsequent symptoms. Consequently, we predicted that the number of 
checked symptoms would be higher when general and specific symptoms were presented 
in streaks than when they were presented in alternation. 
 
Method 
One hundred nineteen students (48% female and 52% male) from a university in the north-
eastern United States were presented with screening information about a fictional kind of 
thyroid cancer (“isthmal”). We chose a fictional thyroid cancer because (a) participants 
could not have prior knowledge about and experience with the disease, (b) thyroid cancers 
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can develop in people of any age or gender, and (c) thyroid disorders are associated with 
a mix of general and specific symptoms. 
Both NCI’s and ACS’s Web pages presented six symptoms for thyroid cancer. We there-
fore followed suit, creating six-symptom checklists in three presentation orders. The general-
to-specific checklist listed three general symptoms and then three specific symptoms. The 
specific-to-general checklist listed three specific symptoms and then three general symp-
toms. Symptoms in the alternating checklist alternated between general and specific 
(again, three symptoms of each type). All three checklists presented the same six symp-
toms. The general symptoms were fluctuations in weight, shortness of breath, and feelings 
of being easily fatigued. The specific symptoms were pain in the throat or neck, difficulty 
breathing, and lump in the throat or neck.2 
Participants were instructed to check off the symptoms they had experienced in the past 
6 weeks and then to estimate how likely they were to have isthmal thyroid cancer com-
pared with the average American. Responses were given on a 6-point Likert scale that 
ranged from 1 (much less likely) to 6 (much more likely). For each participant, we calculated 
the average check-streak length by summing the number of checks in all streaks (i.e., two 
or more consecutive checks) and then dividing by the number of check streaks that oc-
curred. For example, if “X” represents a check and “0” denotes no check, then the sequence 
X00XX0 would have an average check-streak length of 2 (i.e., 2/1), whereas the sequence 
XX0XXX would have an average check-streak length of 2.5 (i.e., (2 + 3)/2). 
 
Results 
As predicted, we found a significant effect of the order of symptom presentation on per-
ceived disease risk, F(2, 114) = 4.74, p = .011, ηp2 = .08 (Fig. 1a). Whereas perceived risk did 
not differ between participants in the two streak conditions (p = .605), participants in the 
alternating condition reported lower levels of personal risk than did participants in either 
the general-to-specific condition (p = .047) or the specific-to-general condition (p = .009). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Results from Study 1: mean perceived personal risk of having isthmal thyroid 
cancer (a) and mean number of symptoms checked (b) as a function of the order in which 
symptoms were presented on the checklist. Participants rated their perceived disease risk 
on a 6-point scale, with higher values representing higher risk. Error bars represent stand-
ard errors of the mean. 
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We then conducted a series of regression analyses to examine the mediating role of 
check-streak length. First, we found that order of symptom presentation was associated 
with average check-streak length, such that the two streak conditions produced longer 
check streaks than did the alternating condition (β = 0.31, R2 = .10, p = .001). Order of symp-
tom presentation was again associated with perceived risk (i.e., exposure to streaks rather 
than alternating symptoms predicted higher perceived risk; β = 0.18, R2 = .03, p < .05). We 
also found that check-streak length was associated with perceived risk, such that longer 
average check streaks predicted higher risk ratings (β = 0.35, R2 = .12, p < .001). Finally, 
when we regressed perceived risk on average check-streak length and order of symptom 
presentation, we found that average check-streak length was a significant predictor of per-
ceived risk (β = 0.33, p < .001) but order of symptom presentation was not (β = −0.08, p > .05; 
overall model R2 = .13, p < .001). 
Thus, order of symptom presentation did not remain a significant predictor of perceived 
risk when average check-streak length was accounted for, a finding that suggests that the 
relationship between the order of symptom presentation and perceived personal risk is 
mediated by check-streak length (Sobel test: z = −2.63, p = .008). These findings illustrate 
that individuals given symptom checklists with streaks of common symptoms check off 
longer streaks of symptoms than do individuals given checklists without such streaks, and 
this exposure to streaks increases respondents’ perception of their own likelihood of hav-
ing the disease in question. 
We also found that the order of symptom presentation influenced the total number of 
symptoms checked, F(2, 116) = 7.66, p = .001, ηp2 = .12 (Fig. 1b). Participants in the alternating 
condition checked fewer symptoms (M = 0.55, SD = 0.55) than did participants in either the 
general-to-specific condition (M = 1.49, SD = 1.43; p = .001) or the specific-to-general condi-
tion (M = 0.88, SD = 1.04; although this latter difference was in the hypothesized direction, 
it did not reach significance, p = .390). Additionally, the total number of symptoms checked 
differed between participants in the two streak conditions, p < .05. These findings suggest 
that people lower their threshold for deciding whether they have experienced a given 
symptom when they are presented with a symptom list that begins with a streak of com-
monly experienced symptoms (i.e., general-to-specific condition). In contrast, people who 
are given a checklist that begins with a streak of severe, rare symptoms are less likely to 
check the symptoms at the beginning of the list, and their threshold for reporting a symp-
tom may not decrease as much. 
 
Study 2: Length of Symptom List 
 
The number of symptoms listed varies across medical Web pages. Our review showed that 
half of the 24 cancer Web pages on the NCI and ACS sites presented 4 to 9 symptoms, 
whereas the remaining half presented 10 to 19 symptoms. This variation depended partly 
on the type of cancer. Streaks are more surprising when they occur within shorter se-
quences (Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2008; Oppenheimer & Monin, 2009); therefore, the order 
of symptom presentation may have a more powerful influence in the case of shorter symp-
tom lists. 
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Intuitively, once a symptom is checked, it becomes relevant to one’s personal risk as-
sessment, whereas symptoms left unchecked become seemingly irrelevant. However, as 
research concerning dilution effects suggests, using only the categories of “relevant” and 
“irrelevant” might be an incomplete framework for understanding mental sorting (Hacken-
brack, 1992; Highhouse, 1997; Kemmelmeier, 2004). Checked symptoms should indicate a 
greater disease risk, whereas symptoms left unchecked should indicate a lower disease 
risk, rather than being considered irrelevant. If given symptom lists with a comparable mix 
of general and specific symptoms, individuals would on average leave more items un-
checked on longer symptom lists than on shorter symptom lists. Therefore, we predicted 
that individuals given shorter symptom lists would perceive higher levels of risk than 
would those given longer lists because they would have fewer unchecked symptoms. Ad-
ditionally, in this study, we used a real form of cancer (meningioma) instead of a fictitious 
one so that we could generalize the findings of Study 1 to a different context. 
 
Method 
One hundred two students (48% female and 52% male) from a university in the northeast-
ern United States received information about meningioma before being randomly assigned 
to one of six conditions in a 2 (length of symptom list: short or long) × 3 (order of symptom 
presentation: general to specific, specific to general, or alternating) between-subjects de-
sign. The symptom lists in the short-list condition included 6 symptoms, and the symptom 
lists in the long-list condition included 12 symptoms. We conducted a pilot study to deter-
mine the 6 symptoms rated the most common and mild and the 6 rated the most rare and 
severe from among those listed for meningioma on the NCI and ACS Web pages. These 12 
symptoms formed the symptom lists in the long-list condition. We selected half of these 
symptoms for the short-list condition while ensuring that the long and short lists were 
comparable overall in severity and commonness of symptoms. Participants were given the 
checklist corresponding to their assigned condition and asked to complete it. They then 
indicated their perceived risk of having meningioma, using the same 6-point scale as in 
Study 1. 
 
Results 
We found a significant interaction between presentation order and symptom-list length, 
F(2, 95) = 4.17, p = .018, ηp2 = .08 (Fig. 2). To probe this interaction, we performed a separate 
one-way analysis of variance for each length condition. Presentation order had a signifi-
cant effect on perceived risk among participants who received a 6-item list, F(2, 52) = 5.27, 
p = .008, ηp2 = .17. A post hoc comparison using the Tukey honestly significant difference 
test indicated that participants in the short-list condition perceived their personal risk as 
significantly lower in the alternating condition than in either the general-to-specific (p = 
.04) or the specific-to-general (p = .008) condition. Risk ratings did not differ between par-
ticipants in the general-to-specific and specific-to-general conditions (p = .720). These find-
ings replicate those of Study 1. 
In contrast, participants who were given a 12-symptom list showed no effect of presen-
tation order on perceived risk, F(2, 43) = 0.65. That is, in the long-list condition, risk assess-
ment did not differ significantly across the three symptom presentation orders. 
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Figure 2. Results from Study 2: mean perceived personal risk of having meningioma as a 
function of the order of symptom presentation and the number of symptoms listed. Par-
ticipants rated their perceived disease risk on a 6-point scale, with higher values repre-
senting higher risk. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Our findings revealed something akin to a gambler’s fallacy in medical judgment. Partici-
pants perceived a higher risk of illness when they completed a checklist in which general 
symptoms were presented consecutively than when those same symptoms were separated 
by rare symptoms. Additionally, we observed a dilution effect: The effect of presentation 
order on perceived risk was not significant for longer symptom checklists. Together, our 
findings illustrate that faulty randomness cognition (i.e., hot-hand beliefs and the gam-
bler’s fallacy) can result in something as arbitrary as symptom presentation order influ-
encing the perceived risk of disease. 
This research provides a better understanding of the potential effect of publicly availa-
ble cancer information on risk assessments. People increasingly rely on online checklists 
for early evaluations of personal disease risk and potential symptoms. Our studies illumi-
nate one reason why subjective risk estimates are highly variable. Also, by identifying two 
components of presentation design that affect risk assessment, these results provide a basis 
for making changes to future designs of symptom presentation media. 
The implications of our findings extend beyond cancer symptoms to other contexts, 
such as the presentation of health-related information during periods of increased disease 
risk (e.g., flu season). For example, in 2009, the U.S. government declared the N1H1 influ-
enza outbreak a public health emergency and released valuable information about when 
to seek medical attention. In such situations, the government may have multiple goals in 
releasing information: (a) to increase the timely utilization of medical services in order to 
prevent serious illness or death and reduce further infection and (b) to conserve medical 
resources by reducing panic-driven, unnecessary use of medical care. According to our 
findings, if the goal is to encourage people to seek medical attention, symptoms should be 
presented in a short list with general symptoms grouped together. If the opposite goal is 
sought, however, then alternating general and specific symptoms is desirable. 
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Notes 
 
1. In our first pilot study (N = 20), we presented participants with all 165 symptoms associated with 
the 12 deadliest cancers listed on the two most popular and official cancer Web sites (NCI and 
ACS). When participants were asked to describe these symptoms, most of them used the words 
“common” or “severe,” which suggests that people often classify symptoms along the dimen-
sions of severity and rarity. In a second pilot study, an independent group of 20 participants 
classified each of the same 165 symptoms as “mild” or “severe” and as “common” or “rare.” 
Overall, participants agreed on the classifications of nearly every symptom. There was substan-
tial overlap between classifications along the two dimensions: Symptoms classified as mild were 
also classified as common (r = .70, p < .001), whereas those classified as severe were also classified 
as rare (r = .81, p < .001). 
2. In a separate pilot study, participants in the alternating condition rated the order of symptom 
presentation as more random than did those in either the general-to-specific condition or the spe-
cific-to-general condition, F(2, 61) = 16.68, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. Judgments of randomness did not 
differ between the two streak conditions (Tukey’s p = .176). 
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